Patent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents, have emerged as a prominent tool to resolve litigation when multiple firms own patents for the same technology. This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools on innovation within 20 industries. Difference-in-differences regressions imply a 16 percent decline in patenting in response to the creation of a pool. This decline is driven by technology fields in which a pool combined patents for substitute technologies by competing firms, suggesting that unregulated pools discourage innovation by weakening competition among innovators. * We thank
1 Patent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents as if they are a single firm, have emerged as a prominent policy tool to reduce litigation risks and facilitate the adoption of new technologies in situations when multiple firms own overlapping patents for the same technology. For example, patent pools have been proposed as a means to resolve threats of crippling litigation and ensure the production of patented inventions in tablet computers, smart phones, video compression technologies, and diagnostic test kits for breast cancer.
The effects of patent pools on innovation, however, are theoretically ambiguous. Pools are expected to strengthen incentives to invest in R&D by reducing litigation risks (Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004) and by lowering the transaction costs of licensing when multiple firms own "blocking" patents for complementary technologies (Merges 2001; Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004) . Pools may also encourage the adoption of new technologies by preventing doublemarginalization (or "royalty stacking"), which occurs when individual firms charge license fees that are inefficiently high for individual parts of a technology (Merges 2001; Shapiro 2001, p. 134) .
1 Pools may, however, also discourage innovation if members choose to free ride on each other's investments in R&D (Vaughan 1956; Lerner Strojwas, and Tirole 2007) . 2 Regulators caution that in the absence of effective antitrust, pools may form that would harm competition: "participants in the pool might be able to use it to collude, for example, by exchanging competitively sensitive information, such as pricing, marketing, or R&D information through the mechanism of the pool (Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2007) .
Existing empirical analyses have been limited to less than a handful of individual industries. Historical data on patents and alternative measures of innovation in the 19 th -century sewing machine industry indicate that the creation 1 Kim (2004) predicts that pools are welfare-enhancing if a subset of firms is vertically integrated, and the existence of a pool allows upstream firms to coordinate their input prices and internalize the impact on profits of vertically integrated downstream members. 2 Vaughan (1956, p. 67) observes that the 1917 aircraft pool discouraged innovation because "pooling all patents of members and giving each the right to use the inventions of the other took away each member's incentive for basic inventions." Pools may also be unstable and fail to reduce license fees (Aoki and Nagaoka, 2004) . Also see Jeitschko and Zhang (2012 (Posner 1970, p. 376) . 6 In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court broke up a particularly pernicious pool, the Hartford Empire pool for glassware: "the history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny over any field of industry…" 7 After this decision, few pools formed until the Department of Justice revised its antitrust guidelines in 1995 and approved the MPEG and DVD standards pools in 1997 and 1999. 8 Baseline specifications compare changes in the total number of U.S. patent applications -by pool members and other firms -across related technologies within the same industry that were differentially affected by the creation of a pool.
This difference-in-differences approach allows us to control for changes in demand and other unobservable factors that may have influenced patenting at the industry level. Technologies are defined at the level of United States Patent Office (USPTO) subclasses. Pool technologies are subclasses that include at least one patent that was contributed to a pool; the number of pool patents measures the intensity of exposure for a given subclass.
In the main specifications, cross-reference subclasses, which patent examiners have identified as closely related to pool technologies, serve as the control. Cross-reference subclasses exhibit similar pre-trends in patenting to pool technologies before the creation of a pool. This helps to address a common 5 Robustness checks drop pools that formed after May 27, 1935, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that price and wage fixing, which had been sanctioned by the NIRA were unconstitutional (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ). 6 In 1941, Congressional hearings investigated antitrust violations through cartels and pools (June 16, 1938 to April 3, 1941 Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 436-37 (1945) . Having grown to include more than 600 patents, which covered machinery to produced 94 percent of U.S. glass containers, the pool had imposed production quotas and prevented licensees from adopting competing technologies. 8 The revised 1995 guidelines treat licensing agreements as pro-competitive unless they can be shown to reduce competition, and allow the formation of pools that combine complementary patents that are necessary to build a specific technology (Gallini 2011, pp. 14-15) .
concern with difference-in-difference estimates, which is that observed effects may be due to differential pre-trends. As closely related technologies, crossreference subclasses may also be affected by the creation of a pool, which will lead us to underestimate the true effects of a pool. Robustness checks repeat the analysis with broader and narrower definitions of the control.
Changes in patenting are measured relative to a pool-specific year of pool creation (controlling for calendar year fixed effects), which helps address the issue that changes in patenting over time may be due to unobservable policy changes. 9 Regressions also include subclass and year fixed effects, as well as separate quadratic time trends for pool subclasses, to control for variation in the correspondence between patents and innovations across technologies and over time (e.g., Moser 2012).
The main data set consists of 75,396 patent applications across 20
industries between 1921 and 1948; these patents cover 1,261 subclasses, including 433 pool subclasses and 828 cross-reference subclasses. Importantly, the large majority of innovations, roughly 97 percent, originate from non-members, even though pool members account for more than 60 percent of output in some industries. 10 This suggests that analyses of pools must consider their effects on non-members.
Difference-in-differences regressions indicate a 16 percent decline in patenting by members and outside firms for pool subclasses relative to crossreference subclasses after the creation of a pool. This result is robust to the inclusion of subclass and year fixed effects, separate linear and quadratic time trends for pool technologies, and interactions between year and industry fixed effects, which flexibly control for industry-specific changes in patenting over time (e.g., as a result of changes over the life-cycle of an industry). Another potential concern with the basic difference-in-differences estimate is that the creation of a pool may be an endogenous response to changes in the speed of innovation that precede the creation of a pool. To investigate this issue, we estimate annual coefficients, allowing estimates for the pool "effect" to be different from zero before the creation of a pool. This analysis reveals no significant decline for the pre-pool period; annual coefficients gradually become more negative after a pool forms, and are consistently negative and statistically significant six years after the creation of a pool.
We also investigate whether part of the observed decline may be driven by a reduction in lower-quality or "strategic" patents. For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004) . 11 The prospect of a pool may also provoke a wasteful race to patent before the creation of a pool (e.g., Baron and Pohlmann 2011; Dequiedt and Versaevel 2012) , so that patent applications that firms submit leading up to the creation of a pool may be of lower quality. 12 The creation of a pool may also increase the quality of patents by pool 11 Surveys of research labs indicate that many firms value patents for strategic reasons (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . In a sample of 95 publicly traded semiconductor firms, firms with large capital investments increased their propensity to patent between 1979 and 1995 as a strategic response to the threat of patent litigation and hold-up (Hall and Ziedonis 2001) . 12 Loury's (1979) model of investment in R&D under uncertainty about the date when a rival will introduce the technology implies that more firms enter than is socially optimal because they do not take account of the parallel nature of R&D. A continuous time model of pools (Dequiedt and Versaevel 2012) implies that the prospect of a pool may induce firms to overinvest in R&D.
members if pool members coordinate their research efforts and avoid duplicative R&D (e.g. Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992) .
To control for the quality of patented inventions, we extend the NBER data set on patent citations after 1975 (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001) These data extend existing data sets in three important ways. First, they include application years in addition to grant years to more accurately measure the timing of invention. The distinction between application and grant years is important because grants can occur several years after application, depending on the workload of examiners (e.g., Popp, Juhl, and Johnson 2004; Gans, Stern, and Hsu 2008) . We extract application years between 1921 and 1948 through a key word search, which yields application years for 97.7 percent of 1,069,414 patents issued between 1921 and 1948. 15 The mean lag between application and grant is 2.7 years with a standard deviation of 1.9 years (Appendix Figure A1 ).
16
Our data also include information on cross-reference subclasses (subsection B), while standard data sets report only primary subclasses. 17 The data also include information on the number of pool members per subclass (subsection C), and extend existing data to include citations from 1921 to 1975 (subsection D). , 1931-1938 In the first step of the data collection, we collected all mentions of patent pools from Vaughan (1956) , Gilbert (2004) , and Lerner, Tirole, and Strojwas (2007) and searched the records of the National Archives in Chicago, Kansas City, New York, and Riverside for lists of the patents that were included in these pools. For 13 pools, pool patents are available from consent decrees at the National Archives; for 5 pools, pool patents are included in licensing agreements;
A. Pool Patents in 20 Industries
for 3 pools, patents are listed in written complaints, and for another 3, patents are included in the final judgments.
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Pools covered a broad range of industries (Table 1) 
B. Patents per Year in Pool and Cross-reference Subclasses
The main specifications compare changes in the number of patent applications per year in 433 pool subclasses with changes in 828 cross-reference subclasses. For example, U.S. patent 1,908,080 (issued May 9, 1933) for a crossrecessed (Phillips) "screw" is assigned to the primary subclass 411/403 for "externally threaded fastener elements," which we define as a "pool subclass." 20 U.S. patent 1,908,080 is also assigned to three cross-reference subclasses:
411/919 ("screw having driving contact"), 470/60 ("apparatus for making 18 For pools in railroad springs, Phillips screws, film, and eyeglasses, patents are listed in more than one source. In comparison with Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole (2007) , our sample includes 8 additional pools between 1930 and 1938 and omits 13 pools for which pool patents are not available. We also exclude a pool for television and radio apparatus because it did not include any U.S. firms, a pool for male hormones (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) because it was short-lived, and a "pool" for grinding hobs (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) because it combined two patents by the Barber-Colman Company. 19 Sixteen pools included grant-back provisions, which required pool members to contribute new patents for related technologies to the pool, and may have exacerbated pool members' incentives to free-ride on R&D by other members (e.g., Aoki and Nagaoka 2004).. 20 Seven subclasses include patents by more than one pool; for them, we define the year of pool formation using the earliest pool. One subclass (352/225) is listed as a pool subclass for two pools. Four subclasses (340/524, 62/056, 524/594, and 174/152R) are pool and cross-reference subclasses; two subclasses (417/426 and 200/56R) are cross-reference subclasses for two pools. We assign them to the pool that formed first. For five pools (fuel injection, pharmaceuticals, railroad springs, lecithin, and aircraft instruments), the pool years include a small number of years after the pool had dissolved. To be conservative we include these years as pool years.
externally threaded fastener"), 470/9 ("threaded, headed fastener, or washer making: process-screw"), which form the control in the main specifications.
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The average pool patent is assigned to 2.0 cross-reference subclasses.
Alternative specifications limit the control to cross-reference subclasses within the same main class, and expand the control to include all subclasses in the main class (e.g. class 411 "fasteners").
C. Subclasses in Which a Pool Combines Patents by Two or More Firms
For a total of 38 subclasses, the creation of a pool combined patents by two or more firms. For example, a pool for wrinkle finishes combined Kay and Ess' U.S. patent 2,077,112 for "imitation leather paper" with the Chadeloid Chemical Company's patent 1,689,892 for "wrinkle finishes." Both patents cover inventions to produced an "irregular surface…by intentionally employing coating materials which dry to a wrinkled appearance or which crack on drying to produced a 'crackled' finish," which the USPTO assigns to subclass 427/257.
D. Citations by Patents after 1921 as a Control for Patent Quality
Citations have emerged as the standard measure for patent quality. Unlike references in academic journals, patent citations are checked by professional examiners who remove false citations and add relevant citations that inventors may have missed.
22 Trajtenberg (1990) shows that citations-weighted patent counts -calculated by adding the number of citations that a patent receives to the count for each patent (i.e. each patent is weighted as 1 + the number of citations it receives) -are correlated with the estimated surplus of improvements in computed tomography (CT) scanners. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) establish a positive correlation between the ratio of citations to a firm's patents and that firm's stock market value. An analysis of field trial data for patented 21 A class-specific digest subclass (16/DIG.39), which "relates to a class but not to any particular subclass" (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/c_index/explan.htm) is dropped from the sample, along with 14 other digest classes. 2002 in the NBER data set (77 percent) were cited by at least one other patent in the NBER data set; conditional on being cited, the patent was cited 7.7 times.
II. RESULTS
For pool technologies, patent applications decline after the creation of a pool, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative definitions of the control.
In pool subclasses patent applications declined from 2.54 per subclass and year before the creation of a pool to 2.40 afterwards (Table 2) , and from 2.80 to 2.48 within a 10-year window before and after the creation of a pool (Figure 1 Nicholas (2010, p. 63) . Linking patents to citations with a long lag may, however, miss many important citations. For example, Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe (2010) find that patent citations in the NBER peak one year after the original grant.
comparison, in cross-reference subclasses, patent applications increase from 2.70 before the creation of a pool to 2.94 afterwards (Table 2) , and from 2.94 to 3.02 within a 10-year window before and after the creation of a pool (Figure 1 ). In the broader control group, which includes all subclasses in the same class, patenting increases from 1.00 patents per year before the creation of a pool to 1.11 patents afterwards (Table 2) .
A. Baseline estimates
Baseline difference-in-differences regressions compare changes in the number of patent applications per subclass and year in pool subclasses with an additional pool patent with cross-reference subclasses, controlling subclassspecific quadratic trends, as well as subclass and year fixed effects:
( Table 3 , column 3), which implies a 14.57 percent decline in patenting.
Consistent with the low share of pool members at the industry level, excluding all 2,058 patents by pool members from the sample leaves the estimates substantially unchanged. Pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produced -0.36 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 15.45 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table 3 , column 4).
B. Time varying estimates for the pre-and post pool period
To test for differential pre-trends, which would violate the identifying assumption of the baseline regressions, and more generally to investigate the timing of effects, we estimate effects separately for each year, allowing them to begin before the creation of a pool:
where pool patents c is defined as above, and k =-17,-16….17, 18 denotes years before and after the creation of a pool forms, k=0 is the excluded period.
Annual coefficients are not statistically significant in any year except t-1, when estimates imply a 9.31 percent increase in patenting. This is consistent with the idea of a (potentially wasteful) patent race leading up to the pool. We examine this in more detail in tests that control for the quality of patents.
Most importantly, however, estimates imply a decline in patenting that Figure A2) .
B. Controlling for Patent Quality through Citations by Later Patents
To control for the quality of patented inventions, we repeat the main specifications using citations-weighted patents (Trajtenberg 1990 ):
(3) Citations-weighted patents ct = patents by application year 1921-1948 ct + citations in patent grants 1921-2002 to patent applications 1921-1948 ct Because later patents are more likely to be cited, citations-weighted patents increase for pool and cross-reference subclasses, but the increase is smaller for pool subclasses. After the creation of a pool, the average pool subclass produced 15.12 citations-weighted patents, compared with 9.89 before. By comparison, the average cross-reference subclass produced 19.40 citations-weighted patents after the creation of a pool, compared with 11.61 before (Table 2) .
Estimates with citations-weighted patents are large and statistically significant. But they are also substantially smaller than the main estimates, which is consistent with the idea that the creation of a pool may lead to a differential increase in the quality of patented inventions for technologies that are covered by a pool. Subclasses with an additional pool patent produced 1.03 fewer citationsweighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table 4 , column 4), which is slightly larger than the estimated decline for the full data set.
C. Subclasses that Combine Pool Patents by More than One Firm
Variation in the number of pool members across subclasses allows us to shed some light on the mechanism by which the creation of a pool may discourage innovation. In 395 of 433 subclasses with patents by a single firm, the pool technology benefits from an increase in complementarities with technologies that are developed by other pool members, which may increase incentives to invent, and there is no effect on the intensity of competition. In 38 subclasses with 2 or more pool members, the pool technology benefits from complementarities across pool technologies, but may also be affected by a decline in competition as the pool combines patents for substitutes by competing firms.
Summary statistics indicate that the decline in patenting is driven by subclasses in which the creation of a pool combines patents by two or more pool members, with 4.20 patents per year before the creation of a pool, compared with 2.60 afterwards (Table 2) , and 4.43 within a 10-year window before, compared with 2.73 patents after the creation of a pool (Figure 3 Difference-in-differences estimates indicate that subclasses for which a pool combines patents by two ore more firms produced 0.44 fewer patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table 5 , column 1), implying a 13.02 percent decline relative to a mean of 3.38. By comparison, subclasses with pool patents by a single pool member produced only 0.30 fewer patents, and the effect is not statistically significant (Table 5 , column 1).
Citation-weighted counts confirm this result. Subclasses with pool patents by more than one member produced 1.37 fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table 5 , column 3), implying a decline of 9.15 percent relative to mean of 14.98 patents per year. By comparison, subclasses with a single member produced only 0.49 fewer citation-weighted patents, and the effect is not statistically significant.
D. Robustness checks
Robustness checks estimate the main specifications with alternative definitions of the control, estimate Poisson models, and exclude pools that formed after 1935, as well as any individual pool.
The first robustness restricts the control to 631 cross-reference classes in the same 108 main classes that include at least one of 433 pool subclasses; the restricted sample includes 62,898 patents. Compared with cross-reference subclasses in the same main class, pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produced 0.39 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 15.79 percent decline, and 1.08 fewer citation-weighted patents, implying a 8.65 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table 6 , columns 1 and 2).
An alternative specification expands the control to include all 69,316 subclasses without pool patents in 108 main classes that include at least one pool subclass and in 61 main classes that include at least one cross-reference subclasses; this expands the sample to include 807,326 patents. 27 Estimates imply that pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produced 0.41 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a decline of 16.60 percent, and 0.89 27 In this test, 285 subclasses that did not produce any patents between 1921 and 1948 are dropped. In the main specifications, these subclasses are excluded by construction, because only subclasses that at least one patent lists as a primary or a cross-reference subclass are included in the sample.
fewer citation-weighed patents per year, implying a decline of 7.13 percent (significant at 1 percent, Table 6 , columns 3 and 4).
We also repeat the main specifications as conditional fixed-effects Poisson regressions to control for the count data characteristics of patents, allowing for correlation over time and in the cross-section. 28 Poisson estimates imply that subclasses with one additional pool patent produced 8.42 percent fewer patents and 7.22 percent fewer citation-weighted patents after the creation of a pool (significant at 1 percent, Table 6 , columns 5 and 6).
29
An additional robustness check excludes two subclasses for aircraft instruments and stamped metal wheels, with 12 and 10 pool patents, respectively, from the sample. 30 Estimates with the restricted sample imply that subclasses with an additional pool patents produced 0.30 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 12.30 percent decline, and 0.99 fewer citationweighted patents, implying a 7.99 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table   7 , columns 1 and 2).
Estimated effects are also robust to restricting the sample to pools that formed before May 27, 1935, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that price and wage-fixing in the poultry industry, which had been sanctioned under the NIRA, were unconstitutional. 31 Regressions with the restricted sample indicate that pool subclasses with an additional pool patent produced 0.31 fewer patents per year after the creation of a pool, implying a 13.54 percent decline, and 0.92 fewer citation-weighted patents, implying a 8.18 percent decline (significant at 1 percent, Table 7 , columns 3 and 4). 28 A key benefit of the Poisson model is its robustness to mis-specifying the distribution. Wooldridge (1999) develops a quasi-maximum-likelihood estimate for the fixed effects Poisson model that is also robust to correlation over time. Estimates remain large and statistically significant when excluding any of the 20 pools from the sample. Excluding aircraft instruments has the largest effect; estimates remain at -0.31 (significant at 1 percent, 
E. A Pool Delays the Adoption of Color Film
Archival records for the movie industry suggest that the creation of a pool delayed technical progress and the transition from black-and-white to color film.
In the early 1930s, Technicolor dominated the market for professional color cinematography with a method that simultaneously ran three separate strips of film, with different parts of the color spectrum, through a specialized camera.
Technicolor's three-strip process produced an exceptionally vivid color scheme but was expensive to rent, with Technicolor in complete control of the market.
In the early 1930s, Technicolor and its competitor Kodak pursued parallel and independent research to develop an alternative method to produced color film, which ran a single strip of celluloid that contained all colors on regular cameras used for black-and-white movies. 34 Less cumbersome and costly than the threestrip process, the "monopack" technology threatened Technicolor's monopoly.
On June 25, 1934, Technicolor and Eastman agreed to pool their patents, amending their agreement on December 14, 1945. In 1947, a government complained argued that even after the amendment, Kodak "continued to refrain from the commercial processing of wide 'monopack' film, from licensing others to engage in such processing, and, with minor exceptions, from selling such film with the right to process to customers other than Technicolor…the development of the art of professional color cinematography by others than Technicolor has been retarded, to the detriment of the general public, the motion picture industry, and the film manufacturing industry.
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Data on patent applications confirm a decline in innovation in film-
making. An estimate of -0.14 for the baseline specification (significant at 5 percent, Table 7 column 5) implies an 8.43 percent decline compared with a mean of 1.66 patents per subclass in the film industries. Regressions that control for the quality of patented inventions yield an estimate of -0.99 (with a p-value of 5.6, Table 7 column 6), which implies a 10.86 percent decline compared with a mean of 9.12. While the pool was active, the majority of movies were in black-andwhite, and large-scale efforts, such as "Gone with the Wind" and "The Wizard of
Oz" (both 1939) produced color with the costly three-strip method.
Innovation increased again after an initial consent judgment on November Technicolor's three-strip cameras.
In the same year, Eastman Kodak introduced Eastmancolor, a monopack film that was of sufficient quality to shoot commercial movies. In December to protect its costly and cumbersome predecessor, the three-strip technology, for which one of the pool members was a monopolist. Innovation slowed during the pool and only increased again after the pool had dissolved, delaying the switch from black-and-white to color film.
Analyses, which use citations by later patents to control for the quality of patents, confirm the differential decline in patenting for pool technologies.
Estimates with citations-weighted patents are, however, noticeably smaller, indicating that firms produced fewer low quality or strategic patents in pool technologies after the creation of a pool. This decline may be due to a welfareimproving reduction in duplicative research efforts as a result of the pool (e.g., Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992) , or it may reflect a socially wasteful race to patent technologies before the creation of a pool (e.g., Dequiedt and Versaevel
2012; Baron and Pohlmann 2011). A temporary spike in patent applications
immediately before the creation of the pool is consistent with the idea of a patent race.
What are the mechanisms by which the creation of a pool may discourage innovation? Regulators are most concerned pools, which combine patents for substitute technologies, may harm competition and discourage innovation. Pools of substitutes, however, have proven difficult to identify. The current analysis addresses this challenge empirically by taking advantage of the USPTO's system of classifying inventions into subclasses based on the function that they perform.
By definition, patents in the same subclass are more suitable to act as substitutes for each other. For subclasses in which all pool patents are owned by a single member firm, the creation of a pool has no direct effect on competition. For subclasses in which pool patents are owned by two or more pool members, however, the pool reduces competition by combining patents for substitutes that were previously owned by competing firms.
Difference-in-differences comparisons indicate that the observed decline in patenting was driven almost exclusively by subclasses in which a pool combined patents by two or more competing members. This result lends empirical support to theoretical predictions that pools, which combine patents for substitute technologies, are likely to discourage innovation and reduce welfare (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2004) . Notes: Data from license agreements, written complaints, and court opinions from regional depositories of the National Archives in Chicago (railroad springs, machine tools, Phillips screws, lecithin, stamped metal wheels, wrinkle finishes, and fuse cutouts), Kansas City (ophthalmic frames), New York City (high tension cables, water conditioning, fuel injection, pharmaceuticals, textile machinery, dry ice, electric equipment, variable condensers, aircraft instruments), and Riverside (color film). Member firms and pool patents are measured at the time of the initial pooling agreement. Trajtenberg 1990) . The timing of invention is measured by the application year for granted patents. The variable pool equals 1 for years after the pool forms. Pool patents counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and list subclass c as their primary subclass. There are 433 (pool) subclasses with one or more pool patents. Columns (3) and (4) exclude six pools for aircraft instruments, stamped metal wheels, wrinkle finishes, dropout cutouts, ophthalmic frames, and slip covers that were formed after the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was ruled unconstitutional on May 27, 1935 in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935 . Including year fixed effects, subclass fixed effects, and linear and quadratic time trends for pool subclasses. Standard errors clustered at the level of subclasses in parentheses. ** significant at 1 percent, * significant at 5 percent.
Notes:
The dependent variable counts patents per subclass and year. The timing of invention is measured by the application year for granted patents. The variable pool equals 1 for years after the pool forms. Pool patents counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and list subclass c as their primary subclass. There are 433 (pool) subclasses with one or more pool patents. The control group consists of patent counts in 828 cross-reference subclasses that patent examiners have identified as related technologies.
FIGURE 1 -PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR: POOL VERSUS CROSS-REFERENCE SUBCLASSES
Notes: Data include 433 pool subclasses that include at least one pool patent and 828 cross-reference subclasses are subclasses that patent examiners identified as related technologies for pool patents. The timing of invention is measured by the year of the patent application; t=0 denotes the year when the pool formed.
FIGURE 2 -ANNUAL COEFFICIENTS, OLS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR
Notes: Coefficient estimates for β k in the regression Patents ct = α + β k * Pool Patents c + f c + δ t + ε ct where k =-17, ….17, 18, counts years before and after a pool forms. The timing of invention is measured at the year of the patent application; t=0 denotes the year when the pool formed. The variable pool patents counts patents that were included in the initial pooling agreement and list subclass c as their primary subclass. There are 433 (pool) subclasses with one or more pool patents. The control group consists of patent counts in 828 cross-reference subclasses that patent examiners have identified as related technologies. Pool Start Year
